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Abstract 
This paper discusses the policies and characteristics of the two main organisations that deal 
with youth violence in Nicaragua. It reveals their problems, deficiencies, ways of insertion 
into the institutional framework, contradictory priorities, and dysfunctional interactions. The 
paper presents the political interference that characterises and shapes these policies and 
organisations, subjecting their performance to power structures articulated by the national 
elites’ hegemony, the weak capacity of the Nicaraguan state apparatus, and the external 
nature of their sources of legitimacy.  
 
 
Introduction 
Following the decline of ideologically inspired armed movements and the decrease in 
intensity of political violence, the forms of violence linked to delinquency have become the 
main concern for several rulers and policymakers. In Nicaragua, the organisations related to 
public order and a number of researchers have identified youth sectors, some organised in 
gangs, as the main protagonists of the recent wave of violence.1 This situation has posed a 
challenge for the police, the organisations that deal with youth, and the justice system. The 
making of policies for youth in general, and for the so-called youth at risk, is now in vogue. 
With a horizon of possibilities conditioned by the social capital of these organisations – 
defined as networks that imply costs and benefits – the viability and impact of policies partly 
depend on the way they are inserted into the set of strategies utilised by the organisations that 
are supposed to apply them.2 The organisations’ share of social capital and set of strategies 
make it possible for different agents (economic elites, non-governmental and international 
governmental cooperation) to enforce their interests and implement their agendas. 
Furthermore, since these organisations were born in quite diverse contexts, and with very 
different shares of social capital, their relationship with the institutional framework varies 
along with their possibilities of applying policies that mitigate youth violence. North insists 
that the institutional matrix and external networks produce interlinkages and dependencies 
that shape organisations and influence their performance.3 Here I will exemplify the 
interlinkages, dependencies, external networks, and dysfunctional interactions of 
organisations that deal with youth violence in Nicaragua.  
 
                                                 
1 Aminta Granera Sacasa & Sergio J. Cuare zma Terán, Evolución del Delito en Nicaragua (1980-1995), 
Managua: Editorial UCA, 1997; Policía Nacional, Plan de prevención de las pandillas 1999, Managua: Policía 
Nacional, 1999. 
2 Michael Woolcock & Deepa Narayan, ‘Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research and 
Policy’, The World Bank Research Observer, 15:2 (August 2000), p.231. 
3 Douglass C. North, Instituciones, cambio institucional y desempeño económico, México: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1993, p.19. 
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This study focuses on the two state entities that have greatest relevance in the making and 
enforcement of policies for youths involved in acts of violence. First, the National Police, 
which is the public organisation of most constant presence in the neighbourhoods where 
youth gangs operate, and is essential for the implementation of justice on adolescents; second, 
the Special Ombudsman’s Office for Children and Adolescent Issues, an organisation in 
charge of applying the Code of Childhood and Adolescence, which instituted the new penal 
justice model for adolescents.   
 
The National Police 
A Retrospective Look 
The current National Police inherited members, chiefs, vision, and a modus operandi from the 
Sandinista Police, which was born in July 1979 as a unit devoted to the defence of the 
revolution. Typical of this kind of organisation, 4 the Sandinista Police had a counterinsurgent 
military vision that prevailed during the 1980s, whose vestiges can be found nowadays in 
certain operations and in the existence of para-police groups in rural areas.5 The police 
officers, just like the members of the Sandinista Popular Army, were trained to tackle 
counterrevolutionary attacks. The institutional legitimacy of the Sandinista Police depended 
on the revolutionary project’s ability to generate consensus. Its members first identified 
themselves as militants of the FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front), and then as 
policemen. 6 Later on, the National Police’s ties to the FSLN were identified by the highest 
officers as the main limitation for its institutional development.7 Politicians that were 
unsympathetic with the Sandinista Party had little faith in the professionalisation process that 
the police initiated after the FSLN’s electoral defeat in February 1990. Therefore, they 
proposed to replace the army and the Sandinista Police with an anti-terrorist corps (of a 
thousand members), an anti-drug corps, an efficient marine corps, and good fiscal vigilance 
against contraband across national borders.8 
      
The institutionalisation of the police apparatus became one of its main corporative survival 
strategies in a highly polarised political arena. With the end of the revolutionary project’s 
hegemony, the National Police had to search for a new source of legitimacy. Since the 
legislative and executive powers were fragmented into more than twenty political parties that 
shunned the inter-subjective understanding that is vital for generating social integration, 9 the 
police turned to several different sources of legitimacy: its Sandinista origin, its battle against 
the rising crime rate, protection of the private sector, and support for governmental decisions. 
It even agreed to become an instrument of repression against demonstrators and strikers, 
proving its willingness to adjust itself and follow the maximizing path derived from the 
opportunity set provided by the new institutional structure.10 The 1992 Police Law defined the 
organisation as an armed entity of a civil, apolitical, non-party, and non-deliberative nature. 11  
 
                                                 
4 C. Wright Mills, La élite del poder, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1960, p.179. 
5 José Luis  Rocha, ‘Breve, necesaria y tormentosa historia del FUAC’, Envío, 232 (July 2001). 
6 Roberto J.  Cajina, ‘De la seguridad del Estado a la inseguridad ciudadana’, in Gobernabilidad democrática y 
seguridad ciudadana en Centroamérica: El caso de Nicaragua, Managua: CRIES, 2000, p.123. 
7 Francisco Bautista Lara, ‘La utopía posible de la nueva policía’, Visión Policial, 1:6 (1999), p.31. 
8 Roberto Cajina, Transición política y reconversión militar en Nicaragua, 1990-1995, Managua: CRIES, 1997, 
pp.51-52. 
9 Jürgen Habermas, Facticidad y validez, Madrid: Editorial Trotta, 2000, p.148. 
10 North (1993), p.152. 
11 Francisco Bautista Lara, Policía, seguridad ciudadana y violencia en Nicaragua, Managua: PAVSA, 2004, 
p.21. 
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Social Capital: The Two Networks in the Highest Echelons of the Police12 
The police discourse was adapted to the new circumstances and prevailing mental models. It 
shifted from a military vision to a citizen security approach that coincides with the rulers’ 
perception that citizen security is one of the national priorities that contribute to the attraction 
of foreign investment.13 The police were given the task of ensuring citizen security, and 
subsequently of transforming Nicaragua into an appropriate recipient for foreign investment. 
Does this adaptation mean that a certain corporative loyalty – with a propensity to please the 
rulers in office – is encouraged within the National Police in order to become a stable 
bureaucracy that, according to Wright Mills, is capable of surviving through changes in the 
political administration due to the fact that its functionaries separate their personal opinions 
from their official responsibilities, vision, and life?14 The definitions found in the legal 
framework have not dissolved the uncertainty about the police acting as an impartial, third 
party. Quite accurately, North noticed that when formal constraints change abruptly, they are 
often incongruent with culturally sanctioned standards of conduct.15 An explanation of police 
discourse (or discourses) and conduct can be sought in the composition of its social capital, 
understanding it as networks that grant a sense of identity and common purpose to both 
people and organisations, and imply costs and benefits.16 In fact, the different postures 
towards youth violence depend on that social capital. Up to this date, the highest positions in 
the National Police are held by approximately forty former combatants of the revolution; they 
occupy the highest echelons and are divided into two networks: the traditional economic elite 
network and the FSLN network.  
 
Members of the traditional elite became police officers in a relatively accidental manner: they 
participated as commanders in the insurrection that overthrew the Somoza dictatorship, and 
afterwards, through a distribution of posts in the government, were granted high positions in 
the police. Following the FSLN defeat, their presence in the organisation contributed to the 
survival of a frequently questioned police force, as they inspired trust among the new rulers, 
who were often personally related to them. Now as they reach retirement and leave the police 
force, these commissioners are reinserting themselves into the economic segments that 
correspond to their social origins. Of the first three commissioners who retired, one is 
currently involved in his family business, another became founder and shareholder of the 
private security company Servipro, and the third became the chief of security at Banco de la 
Producción, a local bank. Their origins in the traditional economic elites have allowed them 
to maintain a certain distance from the FSLN, gain access to other subsistence spheres, and 
continue utilising their knowledge of security.  
 
The fact that many of the highest officers are coming up for retirement after 25 years of 
service is an incentive for them to use their power to foster relationships that, after their 
retirement, will render them profits through the possibility of being hired as permanent 
employees or as highly paid consultants. This explains the police’s special services for the big 
private companies.17 Among other services, the police economy of exchange with the 
                                                 
12 The information in this segment comes from several sources; among them, a former army colonel and a former 
minister of justice.  
13 Ministerio de Gobernación, ‘Proyecto: Apoyo a la implementación de una estrategia de seguridad ciudadana 
en Nicaragua’, Executive summary, Diagnóstico de seguridad ciudadana en Nicaragua, Managua: Ministerio de 
Gobernación, 2002, p.2. 
14 Wright Mills  (1960), p.223. 
15 North (1993), pp.119-120. 
16 Woolcock & Narayan, (2000), pp.226. 
17 For example, during 2004’s Labour Day demonstration, an anti-riot squadron surrounded the Pellas Building, 
headquarter of the economically most powerful family in Nicaragua.  
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economic elite includes protection, information,  and secrecy for white-collar criminals. When 
a company hires a former commissioner, it is obviously paying not only for his knowledge but 
also for his relationships with the police and the courts. Through the exchange of personal and 
mutual services, the power of the elite as a whole increases, and the visions and social 
contacts of the different dominant hierarchies become equalised, similar to what Wright Mills 
found in the American elite.18 The police and economic hierarchies build networks that bind 
them together through history, economic investments,19 and mutual favours. These links 
explain the National Police’s repeated assertion in their discourse of a safe country, just as the 
economic and governmental elites proclaim security to attract foreign investors. This situation 
reflects the police’s current utility function, a trait North identified in organisations that 
enforce the norms.20  
 
The other network is made up of the numerous commissioners with no pedigree, who 
maintain their loyalty to the FSLN Party.21 The existence of this other network explains the 
National Police approach to youth gangs as part of an FSLN strategy to keep close contact 
with groups that have proven to be valuable in supporting student and transportation strikes. 
The proximity to youth gangs and the possibility to involve them in riots is essential for 
Daniel Ortega’s project to govern from below by mobilising the party’s social base.  
 
The credibility that the officers from the traditional economic elite inspire in the government, 
in addition to its Sandinista ties, have rendered benefits for police finances as a whole as well 
as direct benefit for a number of officers. The relative increase in the National Police budget 
during the last five years have exceeded those in the central government’s total budget. 
Between 2000 and 2001, the police received a budget increase of 46 percent, whereas the 
whole state apparatus obtained a 37 percent increase. The following year, the government’s 
total budget suffered a 10 percent decrease, but in contrast the police received a 25 percent 
increase. While in 2005 the police received an 11 percent higher budget than in 2004, the 
whole public sector only received 0.69 percent more. Because of this steady increase, the 
police budget has gone from 2.39 percent to 3.79 percent of the total state budget. From 2000 
to 2005, there was an increase of 2,091 (33 percent) police officers, at least 18 percentile 
points above the country’s population growth. Adding the 593 new officers from 2005, there 
is now a total of 8,360 police officers.22 To the expansion of the police should be added the 
successful private security industry, which represents the realisation of personal investments 
by some of the police’s highest officers.23 Security requires investment as much as investment 
                                                 
18 Wright Mills  (1960), pp.269-273. 
19 Current and former members of the National Police are shareholders of the country’s most important security 
companies, weapons stores, lumber companies, and insurance companies.   
20 North (1993), p.81. 
21 The validity of the links between the Police and the FSLN was made clear with shocking evidence when, in 
order to collect money for Managua’s municipality, recently won by a Sandinista from Daniel Ortega’s closest 
circle, the National Police imposed car license plate renewals that included the unusual prerequisite of having 
paid all taxes to the city’s municipality (‘Diputados citarán por cambio de placas’, La Prensa , 19 March 2005). 
22 Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Presupuesto General de la República, Managua: Ministerio de 
Hacienda y Crédito Público, 2000-2005. 
23 In 2000, 47 private security companies were functioning in Nicaragua and employed 6,536 agents (Godnick,  
et al., ‘Balas perdidas: el impacto del mal uso de armas pequeñas en Centroamérica’, Geneva & Oslo: Small 
Arms Survey & Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, 2002, p.11). In 2005, there were 67 private 
security companies covering 4,153 locations with 9,329 guards and 6,805 weapons (Policía Nacional, Registro 
nacional de empresas de vigilancia, Mangua: Policía Nacional, 2005). In Managua alone, the 8,217 guards that 
work for these companies are almost as many as the total amount of police officers in the whole country. 
Additionally, 5,000 street guards work independently (Antonio Montesinos, ‘Seguridad privada en Nicaragua’, 
2005, at http://www.foroswebgratis.com/foro-mensajes.php?). 
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requires security. The officers of the highest echelons have positioned themselves 
successfully in both the private and public sectors. They have been able to obtain assistance 
from different groups through their strategy of granting unconditional support to 
governmental decisions, fighting crime, and protecting the private sector.  
 
Citizen Security and Youth Violence 
The protagonist of the discourse and actions regarding youth violence is the Sandinista 
network. Since the late 1980s, the National Police have been paying attention to the 
increasing rate of youth violence.24 This new focus of interest was probably due not only to 
the fact that the galloping economic deterioration produced a perfect environment for an 
increase in delinquency and the emergence of the first youth gangs, but also to a growing 
attention from the police towards forms of delinquency not associated with national security. 
The military definition of conflicts gave way to a definition of civil security. But in these new 
circumstances, the Sandinista network applied an approach towards youth violence in general 
and youth gangs in particular that was quite the opposite of their Central American 
counterparts. Their operations directed towards youth gangs were named after holidays – 
Bethlehem Plan at Christmas or Beach Plan in Holy Week – in contrast with the police 
operations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which had names that expressed their 
will to severely suppress gang members: Anti-Gang laws, Broom Plan, Zero Tolerance Plan, 
and Strong Grip Plan. 25    
 
The Nicaraguan police noticed that in other countries ‘zero tolerance’ policies had had higher 
costs – in financial and organisational prestige – than community-based rehabilitation 
policies.26 The Sandinista elite’s ability to use sociological terms and concepts and their 
notoriously superior discursive capacity in relation to their Central American colleagues 
enabled the appearance of innovative proposals and an assessment of citizen security that 
deepened the analysis of youth gangs without criminalising their members.27 The Police 
Delegation of Managua’s District II developed a desalzamiento28 (‘end your rebellion’) 
strategy. Their plan was divided into three phases: truce, armistice, and reintegration into the 
work force.29 This strategy suffered from weak territorial coverage and was interpreted as an 
FSLN strategy to manipulate the gangs.  
   
The police trumpet the thesis that Nicaraguan youth gangs are not as dangerous as those 
found in the rest of Central America.30 Even the Ministry of Government’s citizen security 
assessment presents gangs as groups of youth that vindicate their identity and defend their 
role as members of society. 31 The police publicly claim that criminal violence in Nicaragua is 
minimal. 32 This discourse is connected to President Bolaños’s slogan of Nicaragua as the 
safest country in Central America. On this point, the discourse of the police networks and the 
                                                 
24 Granera Sacasa & Cuarezma Terán (1997). 
25 Marlon Carranza, ‘Políticas juveniles y rehabilitación de mareros en El Salvador’, in Maras y pandillas en 
Centroamérica. Políticas juveniles y rehabilitación, Vol.3, Managua: UCA Publicaciones, 2004, pp.75 & 154. 
26 Francisco Bautista Lara, ‘Causas de la violencia social y delictiva de niños, niñas y adolescentes’, Visión 
Policial, 4:44 (2003), pp.12-13. 
27 Ministerio de Gobernación (2002), p.10. This same conception appeared in Policía Nacional (1999). 
28 The Police took this term from the military nomenclature. Members of the ‘counterrevolutionary army’ who 
surrendered were called ‘desalzados’. 
29 Wendy Bellanger, ‘Saliendo de la pandilla’, in Maras y pandillas en Centroamérica. Políticas juveniles y 
rehabilitación, Vol.3, Managua: UCA Publicaciones, 2004, p.359. 
30 ‘Crimen organizado podría absorberlos’, La Prensa  (20 March 2003). 
31 Ministerio de Gobernación (2002), p.9. 
32 Bautista Lara (2004), p.112. 
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government coincide. However, this discourse should be seen as a strategy of corporative 
adaptation and, as we will see in this paper’s third section, it is not coherent with the 
predominant conduct among the police officers who patrol the streets.  
 
 
The Special Ombudsman’s Office for Children and Adolescents   
On 12 May 1998, the Code of Childhood and Adolescence (Law No. 287) was approved,33 
validating the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Nicaragua. As an expression of legal 
globalisation, which implies the transnationalisation of certain legal models, it involved the 
dissemination of the doctrine of children’s human rights, whose application international 
donors have sponsored in Nicaragua in quite the same way as they have financed judicial 
reforms in Latin America.34 The Special Ombudsman’s Office for Children and Adolescents 
(henceforth referred to as the Ombudsman’s Office) was created in 2000 as an organisation 
under the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office devoted to developing a culture that promotes, 
defends, and respects the human rights of children and adolescents,35 ensuring the application 
of the Code of Childhood and Adolescence (henceforth referred to as the Code).  
 
As a local incarnation of international norms, the Code revokes the traditional model of 
relations based on the notion of children as totally dependent on the arbitrary powers of the 
family, school, police, and other authorities. Rather it posits the idea that children and 
adolescents are full subjects and members of a society who enjoy a set of rights especially 
guaranteed by the Constitution. By reallocating rights, the Code implied an alteration of 
society’s basic normative structure.36 The membership of the judicial community was 
enlarged, and the new members were given an autonomy that altered the traditional values. 
Even though the Code defends the family’s position as the centre of children’s development 
(Article 6), it breaks with the patriarchal conception by proposing punishment for parents who 
mistreat, abuse or exploit their children (Article 26). Most likely those who voted in favour of 
approving the Code either were not completely aware of this and other revolutionary changes, 
or from the beginning assumed that the reallocation of rights could not be undertaken without 
an effective reallocation of resources and a change in what North calls informal constraints.37 
 
As a substitute for the Law for the Protection of Minors (1973), the Code regulates all aspects 
that deal with the development of children and adolescents, and emphasises the specialised 
penal justice system, which absorbs 132 of the 222 articles that comprise the Code. The 
proposed system releases all children below 13 years of age from penal responsibility, 
prohibits the deprivation of liberty for all those below 15 years of age, and grants substantive 
advantages for adolescents between 13 and 18 years of age who have committed a crime, 
protecting them against justice delay, turning the trial into a formative process, establishing 
specialised penal centres for adolescents, and making available an alternative procedure for 
settlement with the victims that keeps the defendant’s record clean. As a result of this new 
                                                 
33 Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH), Procuraduría Especial de la Niñez y la 
Adolescencia, Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia comentado por 27 personalidades nicaragüenses, Managua: 
PDDH, 2000. 
34 Rachel Sieder, ‘Legal Globalization and Human Rights: Constructing the “Rule of Law” in Post-Conflict 
Guatemala’, Crisis States Research Centre/Development Studies Institute research seminar series, 18 February 
2004. 
35 Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH), Procuraduría Especial de la Niñez y la 
Adolescencia, Informe anual de gestión 20001, Managua: PDDH, 2001, p.9. 
36 North (1993), p.67. 
37 Agreements and codes of conduct (North, 1993, p.14). 
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system, the adolescent criminal courts throughout the country processed 15,612 cases from 
1998 to 2001,38 and the number of adolescents deprived of liberty decreased from 449 in 1998 
to only 36 in 2003.39  
 
The Code’s passage took place in a context of reconstruction of the rule of law and a 
subsequent wave of legal reforms and new laws prescribed as a way of ensuring effective and 
democratic governance. In the aftermath of the military regimes, reforming the judicial 
system and validating international conventions and protocols for the recognition of human 
rights became a concern for donors as well as Latin American governments. Hence, over a 
billion dollars have been spent on the region’s jud icial reform since the 1980s.40  
 
Although the Sandinista government was an early signatory of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, it took no significant steps to adapt Nicaraguan legislation to the spirit of the 
Convention, especially regarding adolescent penal justice, and instead maintained the validity 
of the Law for the Protection of Minors.41 By the mid-1980s, some intellectuals who worked 
for NGOs and had financial and ideological support from external cooperation had made 
some efforts to create proposals for youth policies and reforms to the adolescent penal justice 
system that would incorporate elements from the international conventions on the rights of 
children and adolescents.42 Subsequently, they became part of the team in charge of writing 
the Code. The Code’s advocates do not deceive themselves about the circumstances that made 
possible its approval. They know that the juncture was perfect for reasons unconnected to the 
Code’s virtues. According to the Ombudsman for Children and Adolescents, the conventions 
have been ratified and the Code created and approved because children and human rights 
issues have great acceptance at a national and international level. 43 The commercial insertion 
into global markets follows on the heels of a juridical insertion into international politics and 
law. In both cases the insertion is fragile and depends on the erratic nature of domestic 
politics and external pressures.  
 
Both the Code (1998) and the Ombudsman’s Office (2000), as well as the Law to Promote the 
Integral Development of Nicaraguan Youth (2001), and the National Plan for the 
Development of Youth (2001), were approved during the Alemán administration, one 
characterised by its acrid relations with the European Union and US governments as well as 
with agencies of international cooperation. Alemán hoped to reduce the corruption scandals in 
which his government was immersed through a boom in this nominal construction of the rule 
of law. Given this instrumentalisation, 44 a genuine rule of law was fractured from the 
beginning, since, according to Habermas, it is only viable in a climate free of interferences in 
the relationship between administrative power and the communicative power that produces 
law. Instead, as indicated above, the rights were not the result of a process of sufficient 
deliberation and decision. 45   
                                                 
38 Oficina Técnica para el seguimiento del Sistema Penal de Adolescentes. 
39 CENIDH, ¿Dónde están los derechos?, Managua: CENIDH, 2004, p.31. 
40 Sieder (2004). 
41 This confirms Wallerstein’s thesis that the revolutionary forces of the 20th century were, at most, moderately 
reformist (Immanuel Wallerstein, Después del liberalismo , México: Siglo Veintiuno, 1998, p.7). 
42 Carlos Emilio López, Políticas de juventud en Nicaragua. Premisas básicas, Managua: Fundación 
Movilización Social, 1996;  Elías Carranza & Sergio J.  Cuarezma Terán, Bases para la nueva legislación penal 
juvenil de Nicaragua: diagnóstico jurídico y sociológico del sistema vigente (texto para su estudio), Managua: 
Editorial UCA, 1996. 
43 Interview with Carlos Emilio López, Special Ombudsman for Children and Adolescents. 
44 To place the law at the service of a strategic use of power. Habermas (2000), p.237. 
45 Habermas (2000), pp.218 & 193. 
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Controversies Surrounding the Code 
As Maclure and Sotelo point out, “the passage of the Code into law was an important step in 
legitimising the discourse of children’s rights in Nicaragua”. 46 But that step was far from 
sufficient. To comprehend the magnitude of the distance between dictate and reality, it is 
convenient to consider Habermas’s distinction between juridical validity and legitimacy of 
law. Juridical validity is produced when a state authority declares that an enforced norm has 
been sufficiently justified.47 On the other hand, the term ‘legitimacy’ implies an equitable 
consideration of all the distributed interests and values in a juridical community. 48 To become 
legitimated, the norms have to pass a test of universalisation within a juridical community, 
where conflicting interests are decisive. Based on this distinction, one can affirm that the 
Code obtained validity but not legitimacy; or, to use another of Habermas’s distinctions, one 
can say that the moment of validity or rational acceptability, and the moment of social validity 
or acceptability, have not come together. The approval of the Code meant that a certain sector 
of the Nicaraguan juridical community recognised the rightful and fair nature of that body of 
norms and expressed its wish to have it applied in the country. However, the informal 
constraints inserted in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more resistant to 
deliberate policies.49     
 
The unanimity with which the Code was approved in the National Assembly did not last, 
partly because it was not the result of a wider consensus. The dialogue process in which the 
Code was crafted had been restricted to a certain intellectual elite that did not represent what 
Habermas calls the plurality of constellations of interests and value preferences.50 Some 
politicians have openly challenged the Code and tried to present it as some kind of protective 
barrier for delinquent minors. They are particularly uncomfortable with Article 105, which 
states that in cases where two or more laws could be applied to an adolescent, the one that is 
more benign for his or her interests should be applied. Journalists, lawyers, columnists, 
congresspeople, and other artisans of public opinion have filled the mass media with 
challenges to the Code and have received an echo from the population. The members of an 
almost extinct political party adopted the most extreme and deliberative position. In April 
2002, with a sudden demonstration of what some people call populist social conservativism,51 
the tiny Christian Way Party presented a bill to reform the Code of Childhood and 
Adolescence, suggesting that it should come closer to adult penal justice, should make youth 
and adolescents more responsible for their criminal acts, and should include a more extensive 
range of sanctions as a judicial response to their criminal acts.52 The reform proposes that in 
order to prevent the Code from continuing to act as a protective shield for juvenile 
delinquents, the penalty of deprivation of liberty should also be applied to adolescents 
between 13 and 15 years of age, and proposes that to the list of crimes subject to this penalty 
should be added: association to commit criminal acts, threats, damages, etcetera. During the 
discussions that surrounded this reform initiative, the possibility of typifying youth gangs as a 
form of criminal association was contemplated.  
                                                 
46 Richard Maclure  & Melvin Sotelo, ‘Children’s rights as residual social policy in Nicaragua: state priorities and 
the Code of Childhood and Adolescence’, Third World Quarterly, 24:4 (2003), p.673. 
47 Habermas (2000), p.223. 
48 Habermas (2000), p.224. 
49 North (1993), p.17. 
50 Habermas (2000), p.232. 
51 Maclure & Sotelo (2003), p.672. 
52 Bancada Camino Cristiano, ‘Iniciativa de ley de reforma a la Ley No.287 Código de la Niñez y la 
Adolescencia’, Managua: Bancada Camino Cristiano, 2002. 
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With this action, the Christian Way Party secretly hoped to enhance its feeble social base 
through what it considered to be a politically profitable proposal. In May 2004, Wilfredo 
Navarro, former Minister of Labour in the Liberal Party’s administration, presented an anti-
gang bill to the Nicaraguan National Assembly. Just as the Brazilian right wing did at the 
beginning of the 1980s, according to Caldeira,53 the Christian Way Party and the Liberal Party 
appealed to citizens’ fears: the former to challenge the Code and the latter to promote an anti-
gang law that obviously crushes the rights that the Code recognises, and both of them to 
reduce the delinquents’ human rights and the limitations on permissible physical acts by the 
state.    
 
The Limits of the Ombudsman’s Office Social Capital  
In a road full of obstacles, the Ombudsman’s Office is turning to its social capital for support. 
It seeks protection for children and women from its ideological peers located in NGOs 
devoted to human rights. This bond is legally backed by Article 56 of the Code, which invites 
all sectors of civil society to get involved. The social capital of the Ombudsman’s Office is 
based on its cultural capital, 54 which links it to the NGOs and external cooperation, hence the 
importance of its ideology and discourse. This is due partly to its functionaries’ origins and 
social capital, and partly to the fact that ideology yields and is oriented to the incentives that it 
finds in the institutional framework.55 The budget composition for the Ombudsman’s Office is 
a good indicator of the costs and benefits of its social capital. Of the 15.5 million córdobas 
(roughly US$940,000) that the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office received from the State 
in 2003,56 only 6 percent (US$56,400) was given to the Special Ombudsman’s Office for 
Children and Adolescents,57 and this amount only accounted for 19 percent of its total 
income, if we add the US$322,900 it received from international cooperation. 58 International 
cooperation’s financial weight in its budget (81 percent) doubled the weight of all 
international organisations in the public sector as a whole (40 percent), and in ministries with 
great international dependence, such as the Ministry of Health (38 percent).59 
 
With that endowment of resources and configuration of social capital, the Ombudsman’s 
Office took on the defence of the Code. It responded to the political parties’ challenges with 
the publication of a document,60 in which it tried to dispel the myths about the Code and 
instead present it as a historical benchmark that gives rights to a social sector that had been 
marginalised from social policies and law throughout history. The counterarguments do not 
point to the Code’s moral foundation and the benefits derived from its application; rather they 
highlight its character as ambassador of the international legislation. Its legitimacy is 
                                                 
53 Teresa Caldeira, City of Walls, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, p.339. 
54 The term cultural capital represents the collection of non-economic forces such as family background, social 
class, varying investments in and commitments to education, which influence academic success (Bourdieu, 
Pierre, The Forms of Capital, in John Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of 
Education, New York: Greenwood Press, 1986, pp.241-258).   
55 North (1993), p.19. 
56 Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público (2003). 
57 Interview with Carlos Emilio López, Special Ombudsman for Children and Adolescents. 
58 On an average exchange rate for 2003 of 15.1064 córdobas per one dollar (Banco Central de Nicaragua, 
Indicadores Económicos, 10:11 (December 2003), p.122; Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos 
Humanos (PDDH), Informe quinquenal del Procurador Especial de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. Noviembre 
1999-Junio 2004, Managua: PDDH, 2004, p.49). 
59 Maclure & Sotelo (2003), p.679. 
60 Procuraduría Especial de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, Contraargumentos a iniciativas de reforma al Código de 
la Niñez y la Adolescencia, Managua: PDDH & Red de Alcaldes Amigos de las niñas y los niños, 2002. 
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supposed to derive from being a concretion of legal globalisation. But as Sieder observed, 
legal globalisation has different impacts within each local context, depending on the 
institutional framework and the type of legal interactions that have historically characterised 
the relationship between the State and society. 61 In the Nicaraguan context, where legislative 
production has been a monopoly of the elites,62 with scarce information and almost no social 
participation, turning to an external source of legitimacy strengthens the tendency to ignore 
the moment of building social validity or acceptability: in other words, legitimacy. The 
Special Ombudsman for Children and Adolescents acknowledges two key issues surrounding 
this fact: the Code’s greatest adversary is public opinion, for ideological reasons and lack of 
information. 63 The lack of knowledge, discussion, and awareness of the Code has been widely 
documented.64 The Ombudsman’s Office did not assign resources to encourage favourable 
public opinion about it and put citizens on the path towards the necessary consensus.65 For 
this reason, the political elite’s exploitation – in association with the mass media – of the 
Code’s unpopularity to obtain political gains will continue to be a temptation. The opposition 
to the Code is seen as politically profitable. The insufficient legitimacy derived from this 
situation is expressed in a dysfunctional interaction between the National Police and the 
Ombudsman’s Office.       
 
 
National Police, Code, and Ombudsman’s Office 
The Youth Gang Prevention Plan that the police launched in 1999 appeared hardly a year 
after the approval of the Code. Regardless of the rhetoric of tolerance in several fragments of 
the document – an echo of the Sandinista network’s discourse – its application was a good 
example of the repressive perspective.  Even though the Plan mentioned the Code, the rise in 
juvenile delinquency was presented as a menace to social order, and therefore had to be 
eliminated. The Plan was a mixture of rehabilitative rhetoric and repressive proposals to 
destroy gang leadership. A few weeks after the application of the Plan, and in total opposition 
to Article 95 of the Code, more than 400 adolescents, most of them less than 15 years old, 
were arrested without judicial guarantees.66 NGOs have especially denounced the abuses of 
power and arbitrariness in the capture of adolescent delinquents and the infringement of the 
Code by the police.67 Those abuses display the prejudices against the Code that the police 
shares with the general public opinion.    
 
The National Police and the Ministry of Government blame their financial restrictions as their 
main impediment to act as the Code requires.68 But cultural barriers, diversity of visions, and 
police interests have proven to be more efficient obstacles. The police prefer to rely on direct 
punishment, beating young delinquents then freeing them without any judicial mediation. Due 
to the ideological, social, and generational gap between the majority of police officers and 
those at the highest echelons, most policemen do not act according to their superiors’ 
discourse. The policy towards youth violence applied by the District II Police Delegation was 
rather exceptional, and only applied by the delegation’s chief with the help of some of his 
                                                 
61 Sieder (2004). 
62 E. Novoa Monreal, El Derecho como obstáculo al cambio social, México: Siglo Veintiuno, 1995, p.60; R. 
Delgado Romero, ‘La Gobernabilidad democrática en Nicaragua: principales desafíos’, Revista Probidad  24 
(2003), en http://www.revistaprobidad.info/024/015.pdf. 
63 Interview with Carlos Emilio López, Special Ombudsman for Children and Adolescents. 
64 FUNPRODE, Informe final del proyecto justicia penal especializada, Managua: FUNPRODE, 2003, p.80. 
65 Habermas (2000), p.172. 
66 Maclure & Sotelo (2003), p.681. 
67 FUNPRODE (2003), p.66. 
68 FUNPRODE (2003), p.72; Ministerio de Gobernación (2002), p.19. 
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subordinates. The  statements about Nicaragua as a country of undeniable citizen security, and 
about the less violent nature of its youth gangs, are found in documents and articles produced 
by the highest echelons. Among its series of real police actions to deal with youth violence, 
the one with the greatest impact is its participation in the best-selling mass media 
phenomenon: images in the news of police officers capturing and beating young delinquents.  
 
The Brazilian anthropologist Teresa Caldeira, who studied and described the “talk of crime”, 
said it engenders a “symbolic order” that “discriminates against some groups”, and “makes 
fear circulate through the repetition of histories”. It reinforces inequalities, eliminates respect 
for citizen’s rights, and “allows abuses by the organisations of order” by creating stereotypes 
and prejudices.69 The mass media, especially the televised news, has turned Nicaraguan police 
officers into the main characters of ‘images of violence’ that play the same role as the “talk of 
crime”. Those images modify the symbolic order in order to segregate. The domiciles – 
private spaces – of the young delinquents are invaded and exhibited until they are transformed 
into criminalised public spaces. The filmed invasions are discrimination rituals that show 
citizens – labelled as anti-socials – that in practice have no rights. Thus, police brutality 
against them is seen as normal, lawful, and even plausible. The images of violence, like the 
“talk of crime”, “rely on simplifications and stereotypes to create a symbolic criminal who is 
the essence of evil”,70 and against whom anything can be done.   
   
The police could stop the dissemination of these images by changing its behaviour and, since 
a great number of those captured are minors, by applying Article 71 of the Code to the 
media.71 Instead, the police are the protagonists of the violence whose images the media 
disseminates, legitimising and reinforcing the atmosphere of violence in certain contexts. 
Those images of violence show which places are dangerous, due to their occupation by 
violent individuals. In this manner they strengthen the spatial segregation that Rodgers72 
identified in the reconfiguration of Managua through the construction of a network of fortified 
enclaves occupied by the elites that ma intain communication between their separated spaces, 
while at the same time isolating them from the dangerous zones.  The images of violence 
reinforce the stigma based on an unequal distribution of risk. There is no explicit police policy 
to enforce this behaviour, but this violence definitely reflects the actions of the police that are 
more present in the social imagery, performs the conservative politicians’ challenges to the 
Code by them, and is useful for the interests of the highest echelons of the police because the 
perception of a dangerous city wins clients for the private security business as well as 
justifying increases in the police budget.  
 
The Ombudsman’s Office has tried to stop police violence against adolescents. It charged that 
47 percent of adolescent detainees were subjected to mistreatment during detention, 73 and that 
investigative declarations were taken from 11 percent of them without the presence of an 
attorney. 74 These and other anomalies do not depend on the budget limitations the police 
                                                 
69 Caldeira (2000), pp.38-39. 
70 Caldeira (2000), p.344. 
71 That prohibits the diffusion of identification marks that correspond to children and adolescents who have been 
active or passive agents of penal infraction (PDDH, 2000). 
72 Dennis Rodgers, ‘“Disembedding” the city: crime, insecurity and spatial organization in Managua, Nicaragua’, 
Environment and Urbanization, 16:2 (October 2004), pp.113-124. 
73 62.5 % were  hit and kicked, 12.5% were hit and verbally abused, and 7.5% were  hit and received other types 
of mistreatment (Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH), ¿Cara o sol Investigación 
Socio-Jurídica de Adolescentes que se encuentran en Privación de Libertad en los Departamentos de la Policía 
a nivel Nacional, Managua: PDDH, 2002, p.93). 
74 PDDH (2002), pp.87-121. 
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purport to suffer, but on the cultivation of will, which has yet to be undertaken. This process 
has to start with a change of vision. The police officers believe that the Code promotes 
impunity because it takes longer for them to capture the young delinquents than for the 
judicial authorities to let them free.75 Sieder found a similar situation in Guatemala, where 
many citizens blame the New Penal Procedures Code for the rising crime and impunity.76 
Under this perspective, the reduction in the amount of imprisoned adolescents, which the 
Ombudsman’s Office sees as an achievement of the Code, appears as a failure of justice or a 
triumph of impunity. The National Police leadership went to the extreme of admitting that it 
feels impotent in the presence of the Code because it considers it as a legal obstacle to re-
establishing public order.77 The National Police vision of reality and the Ombudsman’s 
Office’s approach appear as divergent mental models,78 with what are perceived as opposing 
aims: the reestablishment of public order for the former, and the primacy of human rights for 
the latter. These differing visions underlie the impossibility of coordinating actions between 
the Ombudsman’s Office and the National Police.      
 
 
Conclusions  
The National Police strategy to survive and legitimate itself has benefited from the origins of 
its highest echelons, some from the traditional elite and others from Sandinismo. That 
bifurcated membership has generated different discourses and actions towards youth violence 
that have often been in contradiction with the most common police actions. Those linked to 
the elite maintain the discourse of a safe country while they obtain public and private budget 
increases for security. The Sandinista group approaches gangs with rehabilitative rhetoric and 
actions of reduced coverage, but only so they can later manipulate them. In their daily actions, 
most officers on the beat participate in the mass media phenomenon of images of violence, 
which reinforce fear and social discrimination. These discourses and actions do not coincide 
with the Ombudsman’s Office’s intentions, as vicar of the international juridical order, to deal 
with youth violence by defending its human rights. The police’s service to the elites, both 
Sandinista and traditiona l, its violence against adolescents, and its ideological stereotypes of 
reality, which prioritise order, characterise the National Police as an entity that reproduces the 
dichotomy of ‘human rights versus citizen security,’ which at present does not work towards 
creating synergy with the Ombudsman’s Office.  
 
On the other hand, the Ombudsman’s Office does not defend the Code based on social 
support, but rather based on its condition as executor of international legislation, a situation 
that places it in confrontation with current public opinion. Just as the agro-export economic 
model made Nicaragua dependent on the international economic structure, the imported 
normative model might prolong the Nicaraguan State’s crisis of legitimacy. Due to the type of 
legal interactions that characterise state–society relations, the preceding organisational 
agreements were not sufficient to make possible the implementation of the Code through a 
simple adjustment. Legal globalisation should be accompanied by the promotion of changes 
in the agents’ subjective models, an application of mechanisms of coercive power and societal 
sanctions, and the fostering of other norms of conduct, all of which will result in a slow and 
prolonged process of institutional evolution. 79 The efforts of the Ombudsman’s Office have 
                                                 
75 PDDH (2002), p.71. 
76 Sieder (2004). 
77 PDDH (2002), p.71. 
78 North (1993), pp.31 & 38-39. 
79 According to North, the absence of these elements in Latin American states explains their failure to apply the 
American Constitution (North, 1993, pp.132 & pp.83–84). 
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not produced the incremental alteration of informal constraints that involves changing mental 
models and norms of conduct to mitigate their incongruity and tension with the new set of 
norms;80 nor has it improved its relationship with the police. Without a working relationship 
and a policy of concerted actions with the National Police, the Ombudsman’s Office has no 
coercive mechanisms to enforce the Code. Its main limitation is not financial (solved by 
external cooperation), but the lack of a strategy to pay the cost of constructing certain political 
transactions, taking into account the diversity of interests, a social consensus that legitimates 
the Code. In Woolcock’s words, we could say that so far the Ombudsman’s Office has built 
bridges but not bonds. 81 It has relied on its international connections rather than foster the 
type of national integration on which it could have striven to establish the legitimacy of the 
Code.  
 
                                                 
80 North (1993), pp.106 & 115. 
81 Woolcock & Narayan, (2000), p.230. 
 14
References 
Bancada Camino Cristiano, ‘Iniciativa de ley de reforma a la Ley No.287 Código de la Niñez 
y la Adolescencia’, Managua : Bancada Camino Cristiano, 2002 
Banco Central de Nicaragua, Indicadores Económicos, 10:11 (December 2003) 
Bautista Lara, Francisco, ‘La utopía posible de la nueva policía’, Visión Policial, 1:6 (1999) 
Bautista Lara, Francisco, ‘Causas de la violencia social y delictiva de niños, niñas y 
adolescentes’, Visión Policial, 4:44 (2003), pp.12-13 
Bautista Lara, Francisco, Policía, seguridad ciudadana y violencia en Nicaragua, Managua: 
PAVSA, 2004 
Bellanger, Wendy, ‘Saliendo de la pandilla’, in Maras y pandillas en Centroamérica. 
Políticas juveniles y rehabilitación, Vol.3, Managua: UCA Publicaciones, 2004 
Bourdieu, Pierre, The Forms of Capital, in John Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education, New York: Greenwood Press, 1986, pp.241-258 
Cajina, Roberto, Transición política y reconversión militar en Nicaragua, 1990-1995, 
Managua: Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES), 1997 
Cajina, Roberto J., ‘De la seguridad del Estado a la inseguridad ciudadana’, in 
Gobernabilidad democrática y seguridad ciudadana en Centroamérica: El caso de 
Nicaragua, Managua: Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales 
(CRIES), 2000 
Caldeira, Teresa, City of Walls, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000 
Carranza, Elías and Cuarezma Terán, Sergio J., Bases para la nueva legislación penal juvenil 
de Nicaragua: diagnóstico jurídico y sociológico del sistema vigente (texto para su estudio), 
Managua: Editorial UCA, 1996 
Carranza, Marlon, ‘Políticas juveniles y rehabilitación de mareros en El Salvador’, in Maras y 
pandillas en Centroamérica. Políticas juveniles y rehabilitación, Vol.3, Managua: UCA 
Publicaciones, 2004 
Centro Nicaragüense de Derechos Humanos (CENIDH), ¿Dónde están los derechos? 
Aplicación e impacto de las medidas de la Justicia Penal Especializada del Adolescente, 
Managua: CENIDH, 2004 
Delgado Romero, R., ‘La Gobernabilidad democrática en Nicaragua: principales desafíos’, 
Revista Probidad 24 (2003), at http://www.revistaprobidad.info/024/015.pdf 
FUNPRODE, Informe final del proyecto justicia penal especializada, Managua: 
FUNPRODE, 2003 
Godnick, William; Muggah, Robert and Waszink, Camilla, ‘Balas perdidas: el impacto del 
mal uso de armas pequeñas en Centroamérica’, Geneva and Oslo: Small Arms Survey and 
Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, 2002 
Granera Sacasa, Aminta and Cuarezma Terán, Sergio J., Evolución del Delito en Nicaragua 
(1980-1995), Managua: Editorial UCA, 1997 
Habermas, Jürgen, Facticidad y validez, Madrid: Editorial Trotta, 2000 
López, Carlos Emilio, Políticas de juventud en Nicaragua. Premisas básicas, Managua: 
Fundación Movilización Social, 1996 
 15
Maclure, Richard and Sotelo, Melvin, ‘Children’s rights as residual social policy in 
Nicaragua: state priorities and the Code of Childhood and Adolescence’, Third World 
Quarterly, 24:4 (2003), pp.671-689 
Ministerio de Gobernación, ‘Proyecto: Apoyo a la implementación de una estrategia de 
seguridad ciudadana en Nicaragua’, Executive summary, Diagnóstico de seguridad 
ciudadana en Nicaragua, Managua: Ministerio de Gobernación, 2002 
Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Presupuesto General de la República, Managua: 
Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 2000-2005 
Montesinos, Antonio, ‘Seguridad privada en Nicaragua’, 2005, at 
http://www.foroswebgratis.com/foro-mensajes.php? 
North, Douglass C., Instituciones, cambio social y desempeño económico, México: Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 1993 
Novoa Monreal, E., El Derecho como obstáculo al cambio social, México: Siglo Veintiuno, 
1995 
Policía Nacional, Plan de prevención de las pandillas 1999, Managua : Policía Nacional, 1999 
Policía Nacional, Registro nacional de empresas de vigilancia, Mangua: Policía Nacional, 
2005 
Procuraduría Especial de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, Contraargumentos a iniciativas de 
reforma al Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, Managua: PDDH and Red de Alcaldes 
Amigos de las niñas y los niños, 2002 
Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH), Procuraduría Especial de la 
Niñez y la Adolescencia, Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia comentado por 27 
personalidades nicaragüenses, Managua : PDDH, 2000 
Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH), Procuraduría Especial de la 
Niñez y la Adolescencia, Informe anual de gestión 20001, Managua: PDDH, 2001 
Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH), ¿Cara o sol Investigación 
Socio-Jurídica de Adolescentes que se encuentran en Privación de Libertad en los 
Departamentos de la Policía a nivel Nacional, Managua: PDDH, 2002b 
Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH), Informe quinquenal del 
Procurador Especial de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. Noviembre 1999-Junio 2004, Managua : 
PDDH, 2004 
Rocha, José Luis, ‘Breve, necesaria y tormentosa historia del FUAC’, Envío, 232 (July 2001) 
Rodgers, Dennis, ‘“Disembedding” the city: crime, insecurity and spatial organization in 
Managua, Nicaragua’, Environment and Urbanization, 16:2 (October 2004), pp.113-124 
Sieder, Rachel, ‘Legal Globalization and Human Rights: Constructing the “Rule of Law” in 
Post-Conflict Guatemala’, Crisis States Research Centre/Development Studies Institute 
research seminar series, 18 February 2004 
Wallerstein, Immanuel, Después del liberalismo, México: Siglo Veintiuno, 1998 
Woolcock, Michael and Narayan, Deepa, ‘Social Capital: Implications for Development 
Theory, Research and Policy’, The World Bank Research Observer, 15:2 (August 2000), 
pp.225-249 
Wright Mills, C., La élite del poder, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1960 
 Other Working Papers in Series 
WP1 Crisis States Programme, ‘Concept and Research Agenda’ (April 2001) – Also available in Spanish 
WP2 Crisis States Programme, ‘Research Activities’ (April 2001) 
WP4 Crisis States Programme, ‘Research in Latin America’ (April 2001) – Also available in Spanish 
WP6 Dennis Rodgers, ‘Making Danger a Calling: Anthropology, violence, and the dilemmas of participant 
observation’ (September 2001) – Also available in Spanish 
WP24 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, ‘Hyper-fragmentation and Traditional Politics in Colombia: Discussing Alternative 
Explanations’ (March 2003, revised September 2004) – Also available in Spanish 
WP25 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, ‘The Times of Democratic Involutions’ (March 2003, revised January 2005) – Also 
available in Spanish 
WP27 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, ‘Criminal Rebels? A discussion of war and criminality from the Colombian 
experience’ (April 2003) 
WP28 Luis Eduardo Fajardo, ‘From the Alliance for Progress to the Plan Colombia: A retrospective look at US aid to 
Colombia’ (April 2003) 
WP29 Jean-Paul Faguet, ‘Decentralisation and local government in Bolivia’ (May 2003) –Also available in Spanish  
WP30 Maria Emma Wills & Maria Teresa Pinto, ‘Peru’s failed search for political stability (June 2003) 
WP32 Carlos Medina & Hermes Martínez, ‘Violence and drug prohibition in Colombia’ (August 2003) 
WP35 Dennis Rodgers, ‘Dying For It: Gangs, Violence and Social Change in Urban Nicaragua’ (October 2003) 
WP37 David Keen, ‘Demobilising Guatemala’ (November 2003) 
WP38 Miguel García & Gary Hoskin, ‘Political Participation and War in Colombia: An Analysis of the 2002 
Elections’ (November 2003) 
WP40 Ann C. Mason, ‘Constructing Authority Alternatives in Colombia: Globalisation and the Transformation of 
Governance’ (February 2004) 
WP45 Kenneth C. Shadlen, ‘Representation, Participation and Development: Lessons from Small Industry in Latin 
America’ (June 2004) 
WP46 Jonathan DiJohn, ‘The Political Economy of Economic Liberalisation in Venezuela’ (June 2004) 
WP47 Ana María Díaz & Fabio Sánchez, ‘A Geography of Illicit Crops (Coca Leaf) and Armed Conflict in 
Colombia’ (July 2004) – Also available in Spanish  
WP49 Sarah Mosoetsa, ‘The Legacies of Apartheid and Implications of Economic Liberalisation: A Post-Apartheid 
Township’ (July 2004) 
WP50 Laurie Nathan, ‘The Absence of Common Values and Failure of Common Security in Southern Africa, 1992-
2003’ (July 2004) 
WP51 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘“Good” States vs. “Bad” Warlords? A Critique of State-Building Strategies in 
Afghanistan’ (October 2004) 
WP52 Manorama Sharma, ‘Critically Assessing Traditions: The Case of Meghalaya’ (November 2004) 
WP53 Andries Bezuidenhout, ‘Postcolonial Workplace Regimes in the Engineering Industry in South Africa, 
Swaziland, and Zimbabwe’ (November 2004) 
WP54 Jo Beall, ‘Decentralisation and Engendering Democracy: Lessons from Local Government Reform in South 
Africa’ (November 2004) 
WP55 Laurie Nathan, ‘Security Communities and the Problem of Domestic Instability’ (November 2004)  
WP56 Angelika Rettberg, ‘Business-led Peacebuilding in Colombia: Fad or Future of a Country in Crisis?’ 
(December 2004) 
WP57 Diana Hoyos & Marcela Ceballos, ‘Electoral Behaviour Trends and Decentralisation in Colombia’s 
Municipalities, 1988-2000’ (December 2004) – Also available in Spanish 
WP58 E. A. Brett, ‘From Corporatism to Liberalisation in Zimbabwe: Economic Policy Regimes and Political Crisis 
(1980-1997)’ (January 2005)  
WP59 Jo Beall, ‘Exit, Voice and Tradition: Loyalty to Chieftainship and Democracy in Metropolitan Durban, South 
Africa’ (January 2005)  
WP60 Manoj Srivastava, ‘Crafting Democracy and Good Governance in Local Arenas: Theory, Dilemmas and their 
Resolution through the Experiments in Madhya Pradesh, India?’ (April 2005) 
WP61 Dennis Rodgers, ‘Unintentional Democratisation? The Argentinazo  and the Politics of Participatory Budgeting 
in Buenos Aires, 2001-2004’ (April 2005) 
WP62 Jean-Paul Faguet, ‘The Effects of Decentralisation on Public Investment: Evidence and Four Lessons from 
Bolivia and Colombia’ (June 2005) 
WP63 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, ‘Deconstruction without Reconstruction? The Case of Peru (1978-2004)’ (June 
2004) 
WP64 Jonathan Curry-Machado, ‘Surviving the “Waking Nightmare”: Securing Stability in the Face of Crisis in 
Cuba (1989-2004)’ (June 2004) 
 
It is our intention for all Crisis States Working Papers eventually to be available in English, Spanish and French.  Some 
in the series have already been translated.   For further details, and an up to date list of Working Papers, and other Crisis 
States publications, please consult  our website (www.crisisstates.com). 

